Concurrent coevolution of intra-organismal cheaters and resisters by Levin, S R et al.
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations Biology
4-2015
Concurrent coevolution of intra-organismal
cheaters and resisters
S R. Levin
D A. Brock
David C. Queller
Washington University in St Louis, queller@WUSTL.EDU
Joan E. Strassmann
Washington University in St Louis, strassmann@WUSTL.EDU
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs
Part of the Behavior and Ethology Commons, Biology Commons, Environmental Microbiology
and Microbial Ecology Commons, and the Population Biology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Biology at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information,
please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Levin, S R.; Brock, D A.; Queller, David C.; and Strassmann, Joan E., "Concurrent coevolution of intra-organismal cheaters and
resisters" (2015). Biology Faculty Publications & Presentations. 64.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/bio_facpubs/64
 1 
Title: Concurrent co-evolution of intra-organismal cheaters and resisters 1 
Authors: Samuel R. Levin
1, 2, *
, Debra A. Brock
2
, David C. Queller
2
, and Joan E. 2 
Strassmann
2 
3 
1. Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford OX1 3PS, 4 
United Kingdom. 2. Department of Biology, Washington University in St. Louis, St. 5 
Louis, MO 63130, USA.  6 
Short running title: Co-evolution of cheaters and resisters.  7 
 8 
*Corresponding author: Samuel R. Levin, Raikes Barn, Hulme End, Buxton, Derbyshire 9 
SK17 0HJ. Telephone: +44 7943334161. E-mail: samuel.r.levin@gmail.com 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
 16 
 17 
 18 
 19 
 20 
 2 
Abstract 21 
 The evolution of multicellularity is a major transition that is not yet fully 22 
understood. Specifically, we do not know if there are any mechanisms by which 23 
multicellularity can be maintained without a single cell bottleneck or other relatedness 24 
enhancing mechanisms. Under low relatedness, cheaters can evolve that benefit from the 25 
altruistic behaviour of others without themselves sacrificing. If these are obligate 26 
cheaters, incapable of co-operating, their spread can lead to the demise of 27 
multicellularity. One possibility, however, is that co-operators can evolve resistance to 28 
cheaters. We tested this idea in a facultatively multicellular social amoeba, Dictyostelium 29 
discoideum. This amoeba usually exists as a single cell but, when stressed, thousands of 30 
cells aggregate to form a multicellular organism in which some of the cells sacrifice for 31 
the good of others. We used lineages that had undergone experimental evolution at very 32 
low relatedness, during which time obligate cheaters evolved. Unlike earlier experiments, 33 
which found resistance to cheaters that were prevented from evolving, we competed 34 
cheaters and non-cheaters that evolved together, and cheaters with their ancestors. We 35 
found that non-cheaters can evolve resistance to cheating before cheating sweeps through 36 
the population and multicellularity is lost. Our results provide insight into cheater-resister 37 
co-evolutionary dynamics, in turn providing experimental evidence for the maintenance 38 
of at least a simple form of multicellularity by means other than high relatedness.  39 
 40 
 41 
Keywords: major transition, multicellularity, altruism, cooperation, cheaters, 42 
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 3 
Introduction 44 
 45 
Multicellularity 46 
Perhaps the most interesting moments in the history of life are the great 47 
transformations in the unit of individuality, when what were previously self-sufficient, 48 
functioning individuals, become integrated into a collective, no longer capable of 49 
replicating independently (Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995). They are interesting in 50 
large part because of the questions they raise about conflict. In order for a higher level of 51 
biological organization to form, conflict must be controlled at lower levels. Consider, for 52 
example, the origin of multicellularity, one of the six widely recognized major transitions 53 
(Bourke 2011). Multicellularity requires anywhere from a few to many millions of cells 54 
to sacrifice for the good of only a minority. Why do the cells in our hands, hearts, and 55 
brains sacrifice their own reproduction so that our gametes can be passed on? 56 
 Inclusive fitness provides one answer (Hamilton 1964a;b). With each generation 57 
the organism passes through a single celled bottleneck (i.e. the zygote), meaning that all 58 
of the cells within the organism are clonally related. Their relatedness is one (r = 1), so 59 
the genetic basis for conflict is effectively eliminated.  In addition, any cheater mutation 60 
that gets a cell into the germ-line will be limited to one round of cheating, because in the 61 
following generation it will be found in a multicellular organism consisting entirely of its 62 
clones (Queller 2000). Thus, inclusive fitness explains how multicellularity can be 63 
evolutionarily stable and may also explain the prevalence of single-cell bottlenecks. 64 
However, questions remain. First, there are alternative explanations for the 65 
prevalence of single-cell bottlenecks; they might serve to purge deleterious mutations 66 
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(Grosberg and Strathmann 1998) or they might be necessary for complex development 67 
(Wolpert and Száthmary 2002). The existence of single-cell bottlenecks therefore cannot 68 
be taken as strong evidence for the importance of conflict reduction.  Second, although 69 
most examples of multicellularity have their origin in clonality, there are a few 70 
exceptions, like the social amoeba, Dictyostelium discoideum. If multicellularity did not 71 
originate in clonality, what level of relatedness would be required amongst the cells for 72 
multicellularity to be stable? The examples provided by social insects show that 73 
extremely cooperative entities (colonies) can be stable without clonal relatedness, in part 74 
through coercion or policing (Ratnieks and Wenseleers 2007), a co-evolutionary response 75 
of other parties to the evolution of cheating.  Are there other forces like this at play that 76 
could promote and maintain multicellularity? For example, could non-cheaters evolve 77 
resistance to cheating? Buss (1987) argued that many aspects of multicellular 78 
development evolved from such an interplay between cellular cheaters and resisters.  79 
Some of these scenarios are implausible under high relatedness (Queller 2000), though 80 
others, such as control of cell division rates, might not be (Michod 1997). But if 81 
relatedness were low in the evolution of multicellularity, such co-evolutionary responses 82 
to cheaters might be required for multicellularity to be maintained. Unfortunately, these 83 
questions are difficult to explore experimentally. Most multicellular organisms obligately 84 
pass through a single-cell bottleneck, such that their intra-organismal relatedness cannot 85 
be experimentally manipulated.  Since D. discoideum becomes multicellular by 86 
aggregation, it is a great system in which to explore what is mostly the path not taken. 87 
 88 
Dictyostelium discoideum 89 
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D. discoideum is usually a unicellular amoeba that lives in soil and moist leaf 90 
litter, feeding on bacteria. However, when starved, the amoebas aggregate, and form a 91 
multicellular slug, which migrates to a new location, at which point about 20% of the 92 
cells sacrifice any future reproduction to form a dead cellulose-reinforced stalk. The 93 
remaining 80% swarm up this stalk, becoming spores, and forming the sorus (the 94 
collection of spores at the top of the fruiting body), which contains thousands of spores 95 
(Jack et al. 2011). The stalk facilitates the dispersal of spores by animal vectors to a new 96 
location (smith et al. 2014) where they hatch into single-cell amoebas.  Spores within 97 
natural fruiting bodies have high relatedness (Gilbert et al. 2007). This is probably 98 
largely due to the isolation of founder cells, but also partly due to weak kin recognition 99 
systems (Benabentos et al. 2009; Hirose et al. 2011; Gilbert et al. 2012). High relatedness 100 
is not necessary for aggregation – different clones mix readily in lab experiments 101 
(Strassmann et al. 2000) – but the high relatedness in the field explains why 102 
multicellularity can be stable even though the fruiting bodies form by aggregation 103 
(Fortunato et al. 2003; Ostrowski et al. 2008). This system has been enormously useful 104 
for empirical social evolution work, particularly with regard to the origin of 105 
multicellularity. Its utility stems from a variety of factors, the most important being that, 106 
unlike organisms with single-cell bottlenecks, D. discoideum’s intra-organismal 107 
relatedness can be manipulated. An experimenter can decide which cells aggregate to 108 
form a slug, thus changing the degree of relatedness of the aggregating cells. Indeed, an 109 
important prediction of the major transitions view of evolution – that multicellularity is 110 
stabilized by self-limitation due to high intra-organismal relatedness – has been tested 111 
using D. discoideum (Kuzdzal-Fick et al 2011). 112 
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 113 
Cheating of Multicellularity in Dictyostelium 114 
 Kuzdzal-Fick et al. (2011), starting with a single clone, artificially maintained low 115 
relatedness in D. discoideum for 31 rounds of vegetative growth, starvation and spore 116 
formation. Low relatedness, maintained by starting each new generation with a random 117 
mixture of 10
6 
spores, allowed cheaters that appear by mutation to be favoured by 118 
selection. These cheaters cheat by increasing their representation in the sorus, while 119 
contributing little or nothing to the stalk. 120 
Further, some of these evolved cheaters were obligate cheaters, which cannot 121 
produce fruiting bodies on their own. Obligate cheaters, unlike facultative cheaters, do 122 
not modulate their cheating based on their partners (Travisano and Velicer 2004; Ghoul 123 
et al. 2014). Here, cheating entails not sacrificing to form the stalk.  In mixtures this 124 
works because the other, non-cheating clone forms the stalk.  But when alone, an obligate 125 
refusal to form stalk means that no spores form either (Ennis et al. 2000; Gilbert et al. 126 
2007), so the organism has no fitness. The importance of this distinction is that co-127 
operation can persist in the presence of facultative cheaters, but obligate non-fruiting, if it 128 
sweeps through the population, eliminates co-operation. Obligate non-fruiters also have 129 
an added experimental value, because the cheaters can be readily identified when plated 130 
out clonally, as they fail to fruit, simply forming a small group of cells.   131 
Even though mutation rates to obligate non-fruiting cheaters are known to be low 132 
(Hall et al. 2013), cheaters readily rise to high frequencies when intra-organismal low 133 
relatedness provides them with fruiting victims to exploit (Kuzdzal-Fick et al. 2011).  At 134 
high relatedness, such as occurs in natural fruiting bodies, these mutants do poorly 135 
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(Gilbert et al. 2007). This raises a question about the evolution of multicellularity. If 136 
relatedness were not high, would anything prevent cheating from sweeping through the 137 
population? Several mechanism could be involved (Strassmann and Queller 2011), one of 138 
which is that co-operators could evolve resistance to cheating. Khare et al. (2009) 139 
demonstrated that resistance to cheating can be selected for when the cheaters are held 140 
constant (not evolving). They presented D. discoideum populations with a cheater for 141 
four cycles of selection. They showed that the repeated presence of the cheater selected 142 
for resistance to cheating. This experiment suggests that it may be possible for co-143 
operators to evolve resistance to cheating. Hollis (2012) tested co-evolving populations of 144 
Dictyostelium cheaters and non-cheaters, and populations of evolving non-cheaters 145 
against non-evolving cheaters, and only found evidence for the evolution of resistance 146 
when the cheaters were not allowed to evolve.  Therefore, it has yet to be demonstrated 147 
that a co-evolutionary response to cheating can evolve before cheating sweeps through 148 
population and multicellularity is lost. Ideally we would like to know if resistance 149 
evolves in real populations, with the cheaters and non-cheaters co-evolving in real time. 150 
Our experiments explore this question.  151 
 152 
Resistance experiment 153 
Our experiments test whether D. discoideum can evolve resistance to cheating 154 
while cheaters are evolving, before the obligate cheating phenotype sweeps through the 155 
population. We used lineages from the Kuzdzal-Fick (2011) experiment, which 156 
underwent experimental evolution at low relatedness and evolved cheating. Non-fruiting 157 
clones – potential obligate cheaters – increased in the experiment and three of four tested 158 
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against the (fruiting) ancestor were confirmed to be cheaters (Kuzdzal-Fick (2011).  We 159 
first confirmed that this ability to cheat the ancestor held for much larger numbers of non-160 
fruiting clones.  Then, to test whether resistance had also evolved, we tested the non-161 
fruiters against fruiting clones isolated from their own selection lines. If resistance has 162 
not evolved, we would expect to find the same proportion of non-fruiters in the sori of 163 
both mixtures (evolved non-fruiters with ancestors and evolved non-fruiters with evolved 164 
fruiters). If the evolved fruiters have evolved resistance to cheating we would expect 165 
them to be better than the ancestors at keeping the non-fruiter out of the sorus.  166 
Our results showed that resistance to cheating did evolve. Because we worked 167 
with clones from populations that evolved from a single clone, this means that resistance 168 
evolved after the obligate cheaters emerged but before they swept through the population. 169 
This has implications for both our understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of 170 
cheating and resistance (e.g. co-operators can evolve resistance to cheating in real time), 171 
and our understanding of the evolution of multicellularity (e.g. there are mechanisms 172 
other than self-limitation that can stabilise simple multicellularity).  173 
 174 
 175 
Materials and Methods 176 
Amoebas 177 
 We used the ancestor and 4 experimental lines from the Kuzdzal-Fick et al. 2011 178 
study. The experimental lines had gone through thirty-one rounds of fruiting, with each 179 
round initiated by spreading a million cells across a new plate, so any new cheater 180 
mutation would be well-mixed among victims (Kuzdzal-Fick et al. (2011)). All four of 181 
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these experimental lines had a reported frequency of non-fruiting mutants of 50% or 182 
more, which we verified with an initial plating of all the lines. 183 
 All lines had been frozen as spores in KK2 Buffer (per liter: 2.25 g KH2HPO4, 184 
0.67 g K2HPO4) with 25% glycerol at -80 degrees Celsius, as described in the Supporting 185 
Online Material for Kuzdzal-Fick et al (2011). For all frozen samples, we thawed them 186 
gently (at room temperature), diluted quickly, counted spores using a haemocytometer, 187 
and then plated 50 spores each onto 10 mL SM/5 plates with 200 µL of Klebsiella 188 
pneumoniae in KK2 (OD600 1.5). Plated spores or plated amoebas took between 76-80 189 
hours to form fruiting bodies. After fruiting, we allowed one week before collecting 190 
fruiting bodies. Details of culturing can be found in Kuzdzal-Fick et al. (2011). 191 
 192 
Population Experiment 193 
 The purpose of the population experiment was to determine whether or not there 194 
was resistance to cheating in the evolved populations. We achieved this by competing 195 
populations of putatively cheating evolved non-fruiters against both the ancestor (which 196 
is a fruiter) and populations of evolved fruiters from the same line. Here population is 197 
defined as a mixture of 25 separate clonal plaques of each type. If non-fruiters do cheat 198 
the ancestor as expected, resistance to cheating will be established if they cheat the 199 
evolved fruiters less or not at all. If the non-fruiter cheats both the ancestor and the 200 
evolved fruiter equally, we would expect to see the same number of non-fruiters in the 201 
sori for both mixtures. This experiment is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1. 202 
In this experiment, for each line (Kuzdzal-Fick lines: 12, 16, 21, and 24), we 203 
initially plated spores at low density (50 spores per plate, 10 plates for each line) and 204 
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allowed them to fruit. For each line we then picked and mixed 25 evolved non-fruiters 205 
and, separately, 25 evolved fruiters. We did this by categorising colonies (by phenotype) 206 
as either fruiters or non-fruiters, and then for each mixture, picking the leading edge of a 207 
colony with a loop, adding the cells to a 1.5 mL micro-centrifuge tube with 1mL HL5 208 
liquid medium (35.5g per liter), sterilising the loop, and repeating 24 times. Each mixture 209 
of 25 clones was created this way for all four lines. We also picked and mixed 4-5 210 
ancestor colonies in the same fashion.  211 
The cell mixtures were cultured in 10 mL HL5 with PSV antibiotic for 2-3 days in 212 
10mL tissue culture plates to allow growth of enough cells to plate at high density. We 213 
split the cultures every 24 hours to keep the cells from overcrowding the plates. This was 214 
achieved by pipetting the solution up and down with an electronic pipette to lift the 215 
amoebas from the bottom of the tissue culture plate, transferring 5mL of the solution to a 216 
fresh tissue culture plate, and then adding 5mL of fresh HL5 with PSV antibiotic to each 217 
plate.  218 
 We then washed the cells three times using HL5 with no antibiotic, so that we 219 
could plate them on SM/5 plates with bacteria as a food source without killing the 220 
bacteria. We counted the cells, and then plated them with K. pneumoniae in the following 221 
ratios: 25% evolved non-fruiters with 75% evolved fruiters, and 25% evolved non-222 
fruiters with 75% ancestor. We also plated each culture on its own (evolved non-fruiter 223 
alone, evolved fruiter alone, and ancestor alone), as a control to ensure that all the cells 224 
grew up on plates successfully. We plated 2x10
5 
cells on each plate in order to allow 225 
thorough mixing of the different clones, and allowed 76-80 hours for the amoebas to 226 
fruit, plus 7 days for the fruiting bodies to be more easily harvestable.    227 
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 Next we pooled spores from 4 fruiting bodies from each plate (evolved non-fruiter 228 
with ancestor and evolved non-fruiter with evolved fruiter), and plated 1000 spores from 229 
each plate onto 20 SM/5 plates with K. pneumoniae (20 plates per experiment mixture, 2 230 
mixtures per line, 4 lines, 160 plates). We diluted the spores across so many plates 231 
because we wanted to see individual plaques as fruiters or non-fruiters (our measure of 232 
non-cheaters and cheaters). We allowed 76-80 hours for these to fruit, and then scored 233 
each colony as either a fruiter or a non-fruiter. We counted the total number of fruiters 234 
and non-fruiters for each experimental mixture, and used this to determine the proportion 235 
of non-fruiters. This served as our measure of the degree of cheating, because it measured 236 
how many of the non-fruiters ended up as spore rather than stalk cells.  237 
 238 
  239 
 240 
Individual Experiment 241 
The purpose of the individual experiment was to confirm the results of the 242 
population experiment at the individual level by looking for resistance to cheating in 243 
individual evolved fruiter clones (rather than evolved fruiter populations), and to look for 244 
variation among individual evolved fruiter clones. If individual evolved fruiter clones 245 
have resistance, we would expect fewer non-fruiters to get into the sori in mixtures of 246 
evolved non-fruiters and evolved fruiters than in mixtures of evolved non-fruiters and 247 
ancestors. However, if not all evolved fruiters have resistance, or if there are different 248 
kinds of resistance in the population, we would expect some mixtures of non-fruiters and 249 
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fruiters to yield the same number of non-fruiters in the sori as in mixtures with ancestors. 250 
The individual experiment is depicted diagrammatically in Figure 2.  251 
 In the individual experiment we used the three lines that most clearly appeared to 252 
have evolved resistance in the population experiment: 12, 16, and 21. We plated these 253 
lines and the ancestor from the freezer at low density (50 spores on each of 5 plates for 254 
the three lines). We allowed 76-80 hours for the amoebas to fruit, and then picked two 255 
fruiter colonies and two non-fruiter colonies for each line. We cultured each clone 256 
separately in HL5 + PSV as described previously (thus, four cultures for each line: non-257 
fruiter 1, non-fruiter 2, fruiter 1, and fruiter 2). We cultured ancestors in the same fashion.  258 
  We cultured the clones for three days. On the second day of culture, we split the 259 
10 mL of culture into two plates. After three days of culture, we washed the cells of 260 
antibiotic by centrifuging the cultures in 15 mL centrifuge tubes and adding fresh HL5 261 
with no antibiotic three times. We then diluted the cells to 1x10
7 
cells mL
-1
. We plated six 262 
experimental mixtures from each line, testing each of the evolved non-fruiters against 263 
both the evolved fruiters from its own line and the ancestor: Evolved Non-Fruiter 1 + 264 
Evolved Fruiter 1, Evolved Non-Fruiter 1 + Evolved Fruiter 2, Evolved Non-Fruiter 2 + 265 
Evolved Fruiter 1, Evolved Non-Fruiter 2 + Evolved Fruiter 2, Evolved Non-Fruiter 1 + 266 
Ancestor, and Evolved Non-Fruiter 2 + Ancestor. The mixtures were a 75:25 ratio, with 267 
the non-fruiter always making up 75% of the mixture. We also plated each clone on its 268 
own as a control to ensure that each clone was still healthy after being in liquid culture 269 
(and that there was no fruiter/non-fruiter contamination). We allowed ten days for the 270 
fruiting bodies to reach the stage of having harvestable sori.  271 
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  We then harvested all of the fruiting bodies for each mixture using a loop. We 272 
diluted the spores from each mixture to 1000 spores in 4 mL of K. pneumoniae in KK2 273 
(OD600 1.5). For each mixture, we plated 200 µL of solution onto each of 20 plates, with 274 
the aim of having roughly 50 spores per plate. We allowed three days for the spores to 275 
hatch, develop, and reach the fruiting stages so we could score them as fruiters or 276 
nonfruiters.  277 
 278 
 279 
Statistical Analyses 280 
  We conducted all statistical analyses using R version 2.15.2 (released October 281 
2012). We arcsine-square root transformed all proportion data (number of evolved non-282 
fruiter spores out of total spores in the sorus) to compensate for skew created by the 0 and 283 
1 boundaries of proportional data. We analysed the data from the population experiment 284 
with a paired t-test (95% confidence level). We analysed results from the individual 285 
experiment using a Welch two sample t-test for samples of unequal sizes (95% 286 
confidence level), and multiple two-tailed binomial tests (95% confidence level). 287 
 For the figures, we plotted relative sporulation efficiency against mixture. 288 
Relative sporulation efficiency ratio is the ratio of cheater sporulation efficiency to 289 
competitor (ancestor or evolved fruiter) sporulation efficiency.  Sporulation efficiency is 290 
calculated as fraction of spores in the sorus over fraction of cells in the initial mixture 291 
(see Buttery et al. 2013).  292 
 293 
 294 
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 295 
Results 296 
Population Experiment 297 
The population experiment tested for resistance to cheating in non-cheaters from 298 
experimentally evolved populations that contained cheaters. We did this by testing 299 
whether the evolved fruiters did better than the ancestral fruiters against the evolved 300 
cheating non-fruiters. 301 
 302 
 In mixtures with the ancestor, the proportion of non-fruiter increased significantly 303 
(two-tailed, one-sample t-test, t3=6.75, p=0.007). The proportion of evolved non-fruiter 304 
rose from 0.25 to a mean of 0.660 (95%CI: 0.463 < u < 0.832), with their sporulation 305 
efficiency about 7 times that of the ancestor (Figure 3). In contrast, the proportion of 306 
evolved non-fruiter did not significantly change in mixtures with the evolved fruiters 307 
(two-tailed, one-sample t-test, t3=1.48, p=0.235). The mean proportion of non-fruiter rose 308 
from 0.25 to a mean of 0.344 (95%CI: 0.155 < u < 0.563). A paired t-test rejects the null 309 
hypothesis that there is no difference in non-fruiter proportion between evolved fruiter 310 
mixtures and ancestor mixtures (Figure 3, t3=-8.29 p=0.004), and therefore supports the 311 
evolution of resistance. 312 
 313 
 314 
Individual Experiment 315 
The individual experiment tested for resistance to cheating in individual evolved 316 
fruiter clones.  317 
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The proportion of evolved non-fruiters increased significantly in mixtures with 318 
ancestors (two-tailed, one-sample t-test, t5=11.04, p<0.001). The mean proportion of non-319 
fruiters increased from 0.75 to a mean of 0.916 (95%CI: 0.884 < u < 0.943). The 320 
proportion of evolved non-fruiters in mixtures with evolved fruiters did not significantly 321 
change (two-tailed, one-sample t-test, t11=-1.09, p=0.298). The mean proportion of non-322 
fruiters decreased slightly from 0.75 to 0.682 (Figure 4, 95% CI: 0.533 < u < 0.813). A 323 
Welch two sample t-test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean 324 
proportion between mixtures with ancestors and mixtures with evolved fruiters (t12.9=-325 
4.22, p=0.001).  326 
The proportion of non-fruiters increased significantly in six out of six ancestor 327 
mixtures (Figure 5, p < 0.05, two-tailed binomial tests, 95% confidence level). However, 328 
the tests of non-fruiters with evolved fruiters showed much more variation.  In two of the 329 
evolved fruiter mixtures (16 F1 + NF2, and 21 F1 +NF2), the proportion of non-fruiters 330 
did not change significantly (p = 0.564 and p = 0.143, respectively, two-tailed binomial 331 
tests, 95% confidence level). In four of the evolved fruiter mixtures, the proportion of 332 
non-fruiters went up significantly, and in six of the fruiter mixtures, the proportion of 333 
non-fruiters significantly decreased (p < 0.05, two-tailed binomial tests, 95% confidence 334 
level).  335 
 336 
 337 
Discussion 338 
Our results add to a growing body of knowledge regarding the nature and 339 
dynamics of cheating and resistance. Numerous studies have explored the nature of 340 
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cheating, both in Dictyostelium (e.g. Ennis et al. 2000; Strassmann et al. 2000; Buttery et 341 
al. 2009; Buttery et al. 2013) and across a wide variety of other taxa. For example, 342 
cleaner fish cheat by biting their host instead of cleaning (e.g. Bshary and Grutter 2002 343 
for fish), co-operatively scavenging Pseudomonas bacteria cheat by not producing costly 344 
iron scavenging siderophore molecules (Griffin et al. 2004), Myxococcus bacteria cheat 345 
in cooperative spore formation (Velicer et al. 2000), and fork-tailed drongos mimic alarm 346 
calls of pied babblers in order to gain access to food (Ridley et al. 2007; Flower 2011) 347 
(see Ghoul et al. 2014 for a review of cheating). Our experiment follows up the 348 
demonstration by Kuzdzal-Fick et al. (2011) that low relatedness leads to the evolution of 349 
obligate cheating, and shows that this cheating is widespread, adding to the stack of 350 
empirical evidence that relatedness is important for co-operation and prevents the spread 351 
of cheaters.  However, factors other than relatedness and kin selection can be important in 352 
limiting cheating. This must be the case in between-species interactions where 353 
relatedness cannot play a role.  Thus, client fish will avoid cheating cleaner fish that bite 354 
(Pinto et al. 2011) and legumes may shut off resources to nodules that fail to produce 355 
nitrogen (Kiers et al. 2003).  Even within species, cheating is sometimes controlled by 356 
evolutionary responses among the cheated.  For example in social insects, egg laying by 357 
subordinates can be controlled either by dominant queens or through policing by other 358 
workers (Queller and Strassmann 1998).  Our experiments, which explored the co-359 
evolution of cheaters and resisters in evolving D. discoideum lineages, tested whether 360 
cheater resistance could play this role in the evolution of multicellularity.  361 
  We first confirmed the result of Kuzdzal-Fick et al. (2011) that most non-fruiters 362 
are obligate cheaters that cheat their ancestor. In the population experiment, the 363 
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proportion of non-fruiters in the sorus, on average, increased significantly in ancestor 364 
mixtures (Figure 3). In the individual experiment, the proportion of non-fruiters increased 365 
significantly in six out of six ancestor mixtures.  The latter result brings the total for both 366 
studies to nine out of ten.  367 
Our main question is whether this evolution of cheating non-fruiters provoked a 368 
co-evolutionary response among the fruiters.  Both the population and individual 369 
experiments show that fruiting clones that have evolved in the presence of non-fruiters 370 
(evolved fruiters) are resistant to the evolved non-fruiters’ cheating.  In the population 371 
experiment, there was no significant change in non-fruiter proportion in mixtures with the 372 
evolved fruiter, and in both experiments, evolved fruiters did significantly better than the 373 
ancestor when tested with non-fruiters.  374 
A possible alternative explanation for this result is that the 31 extra rounds of 375 
adaptation to the lab environment makes both evolved fruiters and non-fruiters better than 376 
the ancestor. This seems very unlikely for two reasons. First, better adaptation to the 377 
growth environment is not expected to enhance cheating; clones that produce more spores 378 
on their own do not typically produce more spores per cell in mixtures (Buttery et al. 379 
2009). Second, the clone used should already have been well adapted to the environment.  380 
Kuzdzal-Fick et al. (2011) used a clone that is descended from strain NC4 collected in 381 
the wild in 1933 (Raper 1984), so it had been in the laboratory environment for over 75 382 
years where it has undergone extensive evolution (Bloomfield et al. 2008).  The 383 
experimental evolution took place in SM/5 medium with Klebsiella aerogenes on agar 384 
plates (Kuzdzal-Fick et al. 2011), an environment that would have been commonly 385 
encountered in those 75 years. Third, to further guard against possible issues of lab 386 
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adaptation, the Kuzdzal-Fick evolution experiment was initiated with a clone taken from 387 
a line previously evolved in the exact same experimental evolution conditions for ten 388 
rounds of fruiting and about 100 cell generations (Kuzdzal-Fick et al. 2011).  The only 389 
real novelty in the experimental evolution environment was the presence of cheaters due 390 
to low relatedness. Fourth, if the lab adaptation hypothesis were true, it would imply the 391 
strange result that, leaving aside the obligate cheating trait itself, the fruiters are 392 
consistently evolving more rapidly to the lab than the cheaters are.  393 
A potential test of lab adaptation by the evolved fruiters would involve competing 394 
them against the ancestor, but this would require different and less comparable methods 395 
because we could not assess frequencies via incidence of non-fruiting.  Moreover, even if 396 
it did show that the evolved non-fruiters did better against the ancestor, that would at 397 
most add a dimension to our understanding of the selection (e.g. see Asfahl et al. 2015 398 
for an example where the adaptation was non-social). It would not take away the 399 
component we have demonstrated – that evolved fruiters resist cheating of the non-400 
fruiters and that this advantage would have been in play in the non-fruiter containing 401 
environments where they evolved.  Resistance cannot be said to be a side effect if it 402 
played a demonstrable part in the selection. 403 
Another possible explanation, though not really an alternative one, is that kin 404 
recognition and segregation evolved during the course of the experimental evolution so 405 
that when fruiters and non-fruiters are mixed, they segregate out and the non-fruiters do 406 
poorly on their own.  However, we did not see evidence of this.  The lawns of fruiting 407 
bodies from the mixture experiments were healthy and uniform, without defective 408 
fruiting bodies. This is not surprising because, although D. discoideum does have some 409 
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degree of kin recognition (Ostrowski et al. 2008, Benabentos et al. 2009; Hirose et al. 410 
2011), the resulting segregation is generally rather weak (Gilbert et al. 2012).  It seems 411 
unlikely that our clones would have evolved much stronger segregation in 31 rounds of 412 
fruiting than natural clones have evolved over countless generations in the field.  413 
However, the issue could bear further investigation, not as an alternative hypothesis, but 414 
as one possible mechanism for the evolution of resistance to the non-fruiting cheaters.    415 
In our experiment resistance evolved before obligate cheating could sweep 416 
through the population, breaking down multicellularity. Prior experiments showing the 417 
evolution of resistance either could not test this because they artificially kept the cheaters 418 
from increasing or evolving (Khare et al. 2009), or failed to find co-evolution of 419 
resistance, perhaps due to experimental design (Hollis 2012). In the latter case, the lack 420 
of findings could be due to having only 10 generations of co-evolution, perhaps because 421 
the main interest in that experiment was selection for cheating rather than resistance.  422 
Our result offers a potential mechanism by which facultative multicellularity 423 
remains stable. The lineages used were kept under artificially maintained low-relatedness, 424 
so the experiment demonstrates that in the evolution of facultative multicellularity, if 425 
there were no high population-structure to keep relatedness high, there could be another 426 
mechanism by which multicellularity is maintained: the evolution of cheater resistance. 427 
This might explain why no lineages went extinct in the original experiment, although 428 
many were showing lower spore production (Kuzdzal-Fick et al. 2011).  We cannot 429 
exclude the possibility that they would go extinct given enough time, but the evolution of 430 
resisters should at least slow the process.  And even if extinction would ultimately occur 431 
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with near-zero relatedness, a modest degree of relatedness together with resistance 432 
evolution might be sufficient to prevent extinction. 433 
 The individual experiment also suggests that there may be variation in resistance 434 
phenotypes in the population. The proportions of non-fruiters were much more variable 435 
in evolved fruiter mixtures than ancestor mixtures. In two of the mixtures no cheating 436 
occurred, in four of the mixtures the evolved fruiter was cheated, and in six of the 437 
mixtures the evolved-fruiter appeared to cheat the cheater.  This raises the possibility 438 
that, although the frequency of resistance in the population may be similar across 439 
lineages, not all individuals have evolved resistance and there may be different 440 
phenotypes for resistance.  441 
These results provoke interesting questions about the nature of resistance. The 442 
population experiment supports previous work (Khare et al. 2009; Hollis 2012) that 443 
showed that resisters can be noble, meaning they do not cheat the cheater, they only 444 
prevent it from cheating (Khare et al. 2009; Hollis 2012).  Though this was true in our 445 
experiments on average, in a number of our individual tests, the evolved fruiter was not 446 
only resistant, but also ignobly cheated the non-fruiting obligate cheater.   447 
Some cheater genotypes have already been identified, but little is known of the 448 
mechanism by which cheating works (Santorelli et al. 2013), and nothing is known about 449 
resister genetics or mechanisms. One question that remains is how frequency affects the 450 
dynamics of co-evolution.  In our cheating tests, we tested only one mixture frequency 451 
but previous work with both non-fruiting and fruiting cheaters suggests that who cheats 452 
does not generally change with frequency (Gilbert et al. 2008; Buttery et al 2009). 453 
Another open question is the amount of variation in the different cheater/resister 454 
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phenotypes and how they interact with each other.   The results from the individual 455 
experiment suggest that this would be a valuable path to pursue.   456 
These questions are relevant to the broader research programme on co-457 
evolutionary arms races. There has already been some evidence of cheater-resister 458 
evolutionary arms races (Ghoul et al. 2014). Among many examples, there is an 459 
evolutionary arms race between brood parasitic cuckoos and their hosts, in which 460 
cuckoos are selected to cheat their hosts through egg mimicry and their hosts are selected 461 
to detect the deception (Davies 2000; Spottiswoode and Stevens 2010; Langmore et al. 462 
2011; Stoddard and Stevens 2011). Although co-evolution was originally conceived for 463 
cases like this that concern interactions between species, the concept has long been 464 
extended to within-species reciprocal interactions, such as between the sexes (Arnqvist 465 
and Rowe 2002) or between nuclear and cytoplasmic genes (Werren 1987).  In our 466 
experiment, in only 31 rounds of experimental evolution, non-fruiting and fruiting types 467 
evolved in response to each other. These results suggest that a co-evolutionary arms race 468 
could occur among cell types in facultatively multicellular organisms. This would be 469 
particularly likely for resisters that are “ignoble”, and cheat the cheaters. Pursuing this 470 
avenue of research will add to our knowledge of cheating, resistance, and evolutionary 471 
arms races more broadly.  472 
Cancer may provide another example of where cheater-resister evolution is 473 
important in the context of multicellularity. Cancerous cells can be considered cheaters at 474 
the intra-organismal level (Nunney 1999; Bourke 2011; Ghoul et al. 2014). 475 
Understanding how non-cheaters can resist cheaters, particularly in a noble way that 476 
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maintains co-operation at the organismal level, is a potentially valuable approach for 477 
research on cancerous cheats.  478 
 479 
 480 
Conclusion 481 
 Our findings demonstrate that, in Dictyostelium discoideum, non-cheaters can 482 
evolve resistance to cheaters when both are evolving together, and that they can do so 483 
before obligate cheating sweeps through the population and multicellularity is lost. This 484 
offers a mechanism by which, even if low relatedness conditions occurred in the 485 
evolution of facultative multicellularity, at least a simple form of multicellularity could 486 
be stabilised by the evolution of resistance to cheating. 487 
 488 
 489 
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 636 
Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of the population experiment. Blue plates are 10 637 
mL SM/5 plates with 200 µL of Klebsiella pneumoniae in KK2 (OD600 1.5). Orange 638 
plates are 10mL tissue culture plates containing HL5 with PSV antibiotic. Micro-639 
centrifuge tubes are 1.5 mL.  640 
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Figure 2. Diagrammatic representation of the individual experiment. Blue plates are 10 646 
mL SM/5 plates with 200 µL of Klebsiella pneumoniae in KK2 (OD600 1.5). Orange 647 
plates are 10mL tissue culture plates containing HL5 with PSV antibiotic. Micro-648 
centrifuge tubes are 1.5 mL.  649 
 650 
Individual	Experiment	
Evolved	Non-
Fruiter	1	
Evolved	
Fruiter	1	
Culture	
Evolved	Non-Fruiter	1	
Evolved	Fruiter	1	
For	3	Lines	
Frozen	Spores	
75%	
25%	
25%	
75%	
Plate	2x105	cells	for	
each	mixture	
Harvest	Frui ng	Bodies,		
Plate	Spores	at	low	density	
Count	Fruiters,	Non-Fruiters	
Evolved	Non-Fruiter	2	
Evolved	Fruiter	2	
Ancestor	
25%	
Evolved	Non-
Fruiter	2	 Evolved	
Fruiter	2	
 32 
 651 
 652 
Figure 3. Populations of evolved fruiters resist cheaters better than ancestors resist 653 
cheaters. Plot of cheater sporulation efficiency ratio of non-fruiters in ancestor and 654 
evolved fruiter mixtures (n=4). Outliers (1.5 times the inter-quartile range (IQR) greater 655 
than the upper quartile or 1.5 times the IQR less than the lower quartile) are shown as 656 
points. Y-axis is log scale. The cheater has a higher sporulation efficiency in ancestor 657 
mixtures than in evolved fruiter mixtures (p=0.022, paired t-test). A relative sporulation 658 
efficiency of 1 would be no cheating, and higher values suggest cheating has occurred 659 
(dotted line at y=1 reference). 660 
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 662 
Figure 4. Individual clones of evolved fruiters resist cheaters better than ancestors resist 663 
cheaters. Plot of cheater sporulation efficiency ratio of non-fruiters in ancestor and 664 
evolved fruiter mixtures of individual clones (n=6 for ancestor mixtures, n=12 for 665 
evolved fruiter mixtures). Outliers (1.5 times the IQR greater than the upper quartile or 666 
1.5 times the IQR less than the lower quartile) are shown as points. Y-axis is log scale. 667 
The cheater has a higher sporulation efficiency in ancestor mixtures than in evolved 668 
fruiter mixtures (p=0.012, Welch two sample t-test). A relative sporulation efficiency of 1 669 
would be no cheating, and higher values suggest cheating has occurred (dotted line at y=1 670 
reference). 671 
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 674 
Figure 5. In the individual experiment, cheaters cheat the ancestor consistently but have 675 
variable results with the evolved fruiters. Proportion non-fruiter in the sori resulting from 676 
mixtures of the evolved non-fruiter with either the evolved fruiters or the ancestors from 677 
three lineages (12, 16, 21). A=ancestor, F=fruiter, NF=Non-fruiter. Error bars are 95% 678 
confidence intervals. Initial proportion non-fruiter, 0.75, shown as dotted for reference. 679 
Values above 0.75 represent cheating.  680 
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